Political Ideologies: An Introduction

Conservatism

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THE FUTURE OF CONSERVATISM On the face of it, it is odd to discuss the future of an ideology that, through its wary scepticism of change and veneration of tradition, appears to be more closely associated with the past than the future. Surely one of the key implications of conservative traditionalismis that itmeans that conservative ideology is permanently outdated, its quest to remain relevant in the context of an ever-changing present being doomed to failure? Conservatism therefore seems to be trapped in an endless game of ideological catch- up. This can be seen in the difficulties that many conservative parties have encountered in coming to terms with issues such as gender equality, same-sex marriage, trans rights and minority rights, with the implication that they have sometimes struggled to attract support from voters who are young, female, gay, transgender or from ethnic minority backgrounds. And yet, it is abundantly clear that conservatism’s attachment to the past has failed to consign it to the ideological fringe, still less threaten its survival. Indeed, a concern to ensure continuity with the past may be one of the sources of conservatism’s remarkable ideological resilience. ‘Traditional’ values may be more compelling and enjoy greater substance than ones that, by contrast, appear merely fashionable, something that may be even more the case as the pace of change accelerates. For an ideology that is looking to secure its future, there may thus be many worse things to be than ‘outdated’. The claim that conservatism is destined to remain a major ideological force is most commonly linked to the relationship between conservatism and pragmatism. Unlike rationalist ideologies such as liberalism and socialism, conservatism is unwilling to be tied down to a fixed system of ideas. The most intellectually modest of political ideologies, conservatism enjoys an unusual degree of flexibility, allowing conservative thinking to adapt to new and challenging historical circumstances. This chameleon- like capacity for ideological reinvention has been demonstrated throughout its history. For instance, during the nineteenth century the UK Conservative Party (then the Tory Party), initially aligned to the interests of the landed gentry, responded to the pressures generated by industrialization by taking up the cause of social welfare, becoming more socially progressive than the Liberal Party of the day. Further examples include the swift conversion of the UK Conservative Party after 1945 to the central principles of social democracy, and its equally quick repudiation of postwar social democracy under Thatcher in the 1980s. However, this latter development arguably had wider implications for the future of UK conservatism. Not only did Thatcher’s neoliberal revolution bring about a radical shift in economic priorities in the UK, but it also witnessed the switch to a markedly more ideological style of policy-making. In so doing, it may have entrenched free-market principles more deeply than ever before within the party, narrowing the scope for future pragmatic adjustments. This, nevertheless, did not stop the Conservative government under Boris Johnson from pushing up spending and borrowing in 2020 to levels that were unprecedented in the UK in peacetime, as it attempted to stimulate economic recovery in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although conservatism seems destined to remain a political ideology of major significance, it is less clear what form of conservatism will predominate in the future. In particular, it is possible to envisage two, sharply different conservative futures. In the first, conservatism is defined by its close alignment with ‘accelerated’ globalization. This form of conservatism is primarily concerned with economic issues and places a priority on the principles of individualism and market. Libertarian and anti-statist tendencies within conservatism therefore flourish at the expense of paternalistic ones. This neoliberal

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