Multiculturalism
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The third and final aspect of liberal multiculturalism is that it regards liberal democracy (see p. 44) as the sole legitimate political system. In this view, the virtue of liberal democracy is that it ensures that government is based on the consent of the people, and, in providing guarantees for personal freedomand toleration, it provides apolitical space for the expression of diverse views and values. This, nevertheless, does not lead to a free-for-all, in which any views and values can be expressed. Liberal democracy is its own gatekeeper: groups and political movements may be prohibited if their goals and beliefs are incompatible with key liberal-democratic principles. Groups are therefore only entitled to toleration and respect, if they, in turn, are prepared to tolerate and respect other groups. Pluralist multiculturalism Pluralism provides firmer foundations for a politics of difference than does liberalism. For liberals, as has been seen, diversity is endorsed but only when it is constructed within a framework of toleration and personal autonomy, amounting to a form of ‘ shallow ’ diversity. This is the sense in which liberals ‘absolutize’ liberalism (Parekh, 2005). Isaiah Berlin (see p. 240) nevertheless went beyond liberal toleration in endorsing the idea of value pluralism . This holds, in short, that people are bound to disagree about the ultimate ends of life, as it is not possible to demonstrate the superiority of one moral system over another. As values clash, the human predicament is inevitably characterized by moral conflict. In this view, liberal or Western beliefs, such as support for personal freedom, toleration and democracy, have no greater moral authority than
illiberal or non-Western beliefs. Berlin’s ([1958] 1969) stance implies a form of live-and-let-live multiculturalism, or what has been called the politics of in difference. However, as Berlin remained a liberal to the extent that he believed that only within a society that respects individual liberty can value pluralism be contained, he failed to demonstrate how liberal and illiberal cultural beliefs can co-exist harmoniously within the same society. Nevertheless, once liberalism accepts moral pluralism, it is difficult to contain it within a liberal framework. John Gray (1995b), for instance, argued that pluralism implies a ‘post-liberal’ stance, in which liberal values, institutions and regimes are no longer seen to enjoy a monopoly of legitimacy (see Figure 11.2).
Shallow diversity: Diversity that is confined by the acceptance of certain values and beliefs as ‘absolute’ and therefore non-negotiable. Value pluralism: The theory that there is no single, overriding conception of the ‘good life’, but rather a number of competing and equally legitimate conceptions.
Civic unity
Cultural diversity
Universalist liberalism (toleration)
Liberal multiculturalism (neutrality)
Post-liberalism (value pluralism)
Figure 11.2 Liberalism and cultural diversity
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