238 CHAPTER 11
of the proper balance between diversity and unity. The three main types of multiculturalism are as follows:
z z liberal multiculturalism z z pluralist multiculturalism z z cosmopolitan multiculturalism.
Liberal multiculturalism There is a complex and, in many ways, ambivalent relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism. Some view liberalism and multiculturalism as rival political traditions, the former emphasizing individualism (see p. 24) and freedom of choice, while the latter stresses collectivism (see p. 80) and group identity. Since the 1970s, however, liberal thinkers have taken the issue of cultural diversity increasingly seriously, and have developed a form of liberal multiculturalism. This is sometimes seen to reflect a shift within liberalism, from an emphasis on universalism to a stress on pluralism (see p. 240). The cornerstone aspect of liberal multiculturalism is an unswerving commitment to toleration and a desire to uphold freedom of choice in the moral sphere, especially in relation to matters that are of central concern to particular cultural or religious traditions. This has contributed to the idea that liberalism is ‘neutral’ in relation to the moral, cultural and other choices that citizens make. John Rawls (see p. 39), for example, championed this belief in arguing that liberalism strives to establish conditions in which people can establish the good life as each defines it (‘the right’), but it does not prescribe or try to promote any particular values or moral beliefs (‘the good’). Liberalism, in this sense, is ‘difference-blind’: it treats factors such as culture, ethnicity, race, religion and gender as, in effect, irrelevant, because all people should be evaluated as morally autonomous individuals. However, toleration is not morally neutral, and only provides a limited endorsement of cultural diversity. In particular, toleration extends only to views, values and social practices that are themselves tolerant; that is, ideas and actions that are compatible with personal freedom and autonomy. Liberals thus cannot accommodate ‘ deep ’ diversity. For example, liberal multiculturalists may be unwilling to endorse practices such as female genital mutilation, forced (and possibly arranged) marriages and female dress codes, however much the groups concerned may argue that these are crucial to the maintenance of their cultural identity. The individual’s rights, and particularly his or her freedom of choice, must therefore come before the rights of the cultural group in question. The second feature of liberal multiculturalism is that it draws an important distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ life. It sees the former as a realm of freedom, in which people are, or should be, free to express their cultural, religious and language identity, whereas the latter must be characterized by at least a bedrock of shared civic allegiances. Citizenship is thus divorced from cultural identity, making the latter essentially a private matter. Such a stance implies that multiculturalism is compatible with civic nationalism. This can be seen in the so-called ‘hyphenated nationality’ that operates in the USA,
through which people view themselves as African-Americans, Polish- Americans, German-Americans and so on. In this tradition, integration, rather than diversity, is emphasized in the public sphere. The USA, for instance, stresses proficiency in English and a knowledge of US political history as preconditions for gaining citizenship.
Deep diversity: Diversity that rejects the idea of objective or ‘absolute’ standards and so is based on moral relativism.
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